Florida Law Review
Volume 43

Issue 4

Article 2

September 1991

Pension Plans: Why Antenuptial Agreements Cannot Reliquish
Survivor Benefits
Michael D. Rose

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael D. Rose, Pension Plans: Why Antenuptial Agreements Cannot Reliquish Survivor Benefits, 43 Fla.
L. Rev. 723 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Rose: Pension Plans: Why Antenuptial Agreements Cannot Reliquish Surviv

PENSION PLANS: WHY ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
CANNOT RELINQUISH SURVIVOR BENEFITS*
Michael D. Rose**
I.

SURVIVOR BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS UNDER

II. ASSIGNMENT OR ALIENATION PROHIBITION
III. ERISA PREEMPTION ..........................
IV.
V.

ERISA.
......

725
729
732

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ........................

735

CONCLUSION ................................

737

Throughout the United States today, individuals with children from
previous marriages are deciding to remarry. These individuals may
prefer that after their death, their children, rather than their most
recent spouses, enjoy their property. To effectuate this intent, individuals planning to remarry may use antenuptial agreements to ensure
that their children receive their property,' including any interests in
private pension plans.
Individuals seeking to prevent surviving spouses from receiving
their property may use form contracts designed for this purpose. Some
of these forms state that the contracting parties relinquish all rights
to each other's property. 2 Some forms specifically refer to benefits in

*@1991, Michael D. Rose. All rights reserved.
**Lawrence D. Stanley Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A., 1959, Ohio Wesleyan
University; J.D., 1963, Case-Western Reserve University; LL.M., 1967, Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., Davis, Till Death Do Us Part:Antenuptial Agreements ConcerningWills and
Estates, 8 PRoB. L.J. 301, 304 (1988); Flanagan & Stix, Share and Share Unalike, FORBES,
June 10, 1991, at 116; Smolowe, What PriceLove?, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990, at 94; cf. Gamble, The
Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692, 730-33 (1972) (indicating that out of 54
antenuptial agreement cases surveyed most involved older parties with children from previous
marriages). See generally Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1059 (1988) (discussing reasons individuals enter into antenuptial agreements).
Antenuptial agreements that provide for the distribution of property on death have been
regarded as presumptively valid for decades. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048
n.4 (Alaska 1987).
2. See, e.g., 7 W. MULLOY, WEST LEGAL FORMS: DOMESTIC RELATIONS WITH TAX
ANALYSIS ch. 3 (1983); AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D §§ 139:21-:91 (rev. ed. 1985); 4 J. RABiN
& M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS, Forms 10.01-.13 (1991).
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retirement plans. 3 In addition, section three of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act states that parties to an antenuptial agreement may
contract with respect to rights to any property, the disposition of
property at death, the elimination of spousal support, and "any other
matter" not contrary to public policy or criminal law. 4 This section of
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act suggests that the beneficiary
of a retirement plan may relinquish any interest in the plan through
an antenuptial agreement. 5 However, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 as amended by the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984 (REAct),7 mandates that certain private retirement
plans provide survivor benefits for nonparticipant spouses, unless they
consent to the participant spouses' waivers of those benefits.8
Courts have focused on the validity and effect of antenuptial agreements under state law. They have not considered the impact of federal
ERISA provisions on family law and estate planning. 9 However, the
3. See 7 W. MULLOY, WEST LEGAL FORMS: DOMESTIC RELATIONS WITH TAX ANALYSIS
§ 3.36 (Supp. 1990). The antenuptial agreement in § 3.36 provides in $15.c that neither person
shall acquire rights in the retirement benefits of the other. Id. Paragraph 18 of the agreement
states that the parties "waive, relinquish, and release . . . claims and rights" in retirement
benefits. Id.
4. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (1983) [hereinafter Act]. Sixteen states have
adopted the Act. They are Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, and Virginia. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1991).
The effective dates range from January 1, 1986, for California, to January 1, 1990, for Illinois. Id.
5. See, e.g., 7 W. MULLOY, supra note 3, § 3.1A (highlighting a discussion of the Act by
two attorneys who practice in New Jersey, which adopted the Act in 1988); id. § 3.36 (providing
a form agreement that waives retirement rights and benefits).
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)) [hereinafter ERISA]. The original
statute has been amended a number of times. See Conison, The Federal Common Law of ERISA
Plan Attorneys, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1052 n.2 (1990).
7. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter REAct].
8. See ERISA § 205(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a) (1991) (unless otherwise
stated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code will be to the 1986 Code, as amended and
in effect for 1991). Contra In re Estate of Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d 427, 574 N.E.2d 230 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that a party to an antenuptial agreement relinquished survivor benefits);
infra text accompanying notes 21-47 (discussing In re Estate of Hopkins).
9. Two articles, however, have discussed in detail the impact of ERISA on antenuptial
agreements. Springs & Bruce, MaritalAgreements: Uses, Techniques, and Tax Ramifications
in the Estate Planning Context, 21 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLANNING ch. 7 (1987); Melbinger
& Melbinger, How to Allocate Pension Benefits in PrenuptialAgreements, TR. & EST., July
1986, at 26. Other references to antenuptial agreements and retirement plan distributions include
Gamble, Planningfor DistributionsFrom Retirement Plans, 45 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx'N §
27.07[8]-[9] (1987); Ray & Johnson, Estate Planning and Qualified Plans After DEFRA and
REA, 38 U. So. CAL. L. CENTER INST. FED TAX'N ch. 15, 15-53 to -54 (1986).
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failure of attorneys to understand the impact of ERISA may expose
them to claims of malpractice.1°
I.

SURVIVOR BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS UNDER

ERISA

In passing REAct in 1984 as an amendment to ERISA, Congress
sought to achieve "greater equity under private pension plans for
workers and their spouses ... by taking into account ... the status
of marriage as an economic partnership.", Because Congress viewed

marriage as an economic partnership, Congress decided that spouses
"should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement income.1'
ERISA requires most private retirement plans to provide benefits

for spouses of retired participants in the form of joint and survivor
annuities.' 3 ERISA further requires most plans to provide survivor

annuities for spouses of participants with vested rights when the participant dies before retiring. 14 Under ERISA, however, married par-

ticipants may waive both forms of annuities provided to nonparticipant
spouses. 15 Waivers are not effective, however, unless the nonpartici-

10. See, e.g., Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning - You've Got to Know
When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 193 (1990); Adams & Abendroth,
MalpracticeClimate Heats Up for Estate Planners, TR. & EsT., Apr. 1987, at 41.
11. S.REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2547. Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, who was the original sponsor
of the bill that became REAct, said that the legislation 'isan attempt to improve the odds that
women... will enjoy an old age of financial security." Pension Equity Act of 1983: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983). She added that women are dependent on
their husbands and their earnings and are "at the mercy of death or divorce." Id.
12. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2558. It is doubtful that Congress intended to protect surviving spouses
who had been married before and entered into antenuptial agreements under which the children
of earlier marriages are to receive the property of their parents.
13. ERISA § 205(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(1) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(ll)(A)(i). ERISA is
recodified as part of the labor title of the United States Code, Title 29, and as part of the
Internal Revenue title of the United States Code, Title 26.
Survivor annuities are required for defined benefit plans and for defined contribution plans
subject to statutory funding standards. ERISA § 205(b)(1)(A), (B); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(A),
(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(l1)(B)(i), (ii). Profit-sharing and stock bonus plans must provide
survivor benefits unless certain conditions are satisfied. ERISA § 205(b)(1)(C); 29 U.S.C. §
1055(b)(1)(C) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(B)(iii).
If a participant is single and receives a life annuity at retirement, a subsequent marriage
has no effect on the annuity. The nonparticipant spouse has no rights in the annuity under
federal law.
14. ERISA § 205(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(2) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(A)(ii).
15. ERISA § 205(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1).
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pant spouse consents to the waiver in writing. 16 The written consent
must acknowledge the effect of the waiver and be witnessed by a
representative of the plan or a notary public. 17 In addition, a waiver
is valid only if completed within the applicable election period.18 Finally, ERISA requires that prior to the annuity starting date, a retirement plan must furnish the participant with a written explanation of
(1) the terms of the annuity, (2) the participant's right to elect to
waive the annuity, (3) the rights of the nonparticipant spouse, 19 and
(4) the right of the participant to revoke the election.Although REAct's 1984 addition to ERISA provides for survivor
benefits and their waiver, an Illinois appellate court held recently in
In re Estate of Hopkins2' that a surviving nonparticipant spouse was
not entitled to benefits under a deceased participant's retirement

plan.2 In Hopkins, the surviving nonparticipant had signed an antenuptial agreement the day before she married the participant.- The

16. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(A).
17. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A)(iii); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(A)(iii).
18. ERISA § 205(c)(1), (7); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1), (7) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A), (6).
The applicable election period for a joint and survivor annuity is the 90-day period before the
retirement annuity starting date. ERISA § 205(c)(7)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(7)(A) (1988). For
a preretirement survivor annuity the election period is between the first day of the plan year
in which the participant attains age 35 and the date the participant dies. ERISA § 205(c)(7)(B);
29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(7)(B) (1988).
19. ERISA § 205(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(d). A plan may provide
that to qualify for the survivor annuity, a spouse must have been married to the participant
for a year. ERISA § 205(f); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(d).
20. ERISA § 205(c)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(3).
The Code regulations state: "A plan may preclude a spouse from revoking consent once it
has been given." Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-20, A-30 (1988).
21. 214 Ill. App. 3d 427, 574 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
22. Id. at 434-35, 574 N.E.2d at 236.
23. Id. at 430, 574 N.E.2d at 232. The parties married in 1982, more than two years before
REAct amended ERISA. Id. The participant died in November 1985. Id.
The argument that REAct is unconstitutional as applied to antenuptial agreements entered
into before 1984 is without merit. The Contract Clause of the Constitution precludes a state or
local government from passing a law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10. The clause does not apply to the federal government. Due process principles impose
some limits on federal economic legislation, but the Supreme Court has said:
When the contract is a private one, and when the impairing statute is a federal
one, this next inquiry [after the reviewing court determines that the impairment
is substantial] is especially limited, and the judicial scrutiny quite minimal. The
party asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation must overcome a presumption of constitutionality and "establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way."
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antenuptial agreement recited that any property the parties acquired
'"n their sole and separate capacities shall remain separate and free
from claims of the other, the same as the separate property now
owned by them."''24 A separate paragraph of the agreement stated that
"[a]ll properties ... acquired after the marriage or to which he [the
participant] may become entitled.., shall be and remain forever his
own... as if the contemplated marriage had never occurred."''
The Hopkins court held that the surviving spouse had relinquished

her rights to the plan's automatic survivorship benefits when she
signed the antenuptial agreement one day before her marriage. 26 The

court found that the participant spouse's signature on the antenuptial
agreement fulfilled ERISA's waiver requirement of obtaining the nonparticipant spouse's consent.2 The court noted that the consent given

in the antenuptial agreement2 was in writing and notarized, as required under REAct. 29 However, the Hopkins court overlooked the

statutory requirement of spousal consent.s When the nonparticipant
signed the antenuptial agreement, she was not married to the participant.3' Thus, the nonparticipant did not consent to waive her survivor

benefits as a spouse.
The Hopkins court relied on Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown8 2 for the proposition that surviving

spouses can relinquish their interests in automatic survivor benefits

National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985)
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). See generally J. NowAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing due process
limitations on retroactive legislation).
24. Hopkins, 214 Ill.
App. 3d at 433, 574 N.E.2d at 234.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 432-38, 574 N.E.2d at 233-38. Contra Hurwitz v. Sher, 789 F. Supp. 134
(S.D. N.Y. 1992) (holding that an antenuptial agreement did not constitute a valid waiver of
the surviving spouse's rights as a beneficiary under a qualified pension plan).
27. See Hopkins, 214 Ill.
App. 3d at 432-38, 574 N.E.2d at 233-38.
28. Id. at 434, 574 N.E.2d at 236. An antenuptial agreement "does not satisfy the applicable
consent requirements." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-28 (1988). The Hopkins court regarded
this conclusion as incorrect and declined to follow it. Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 437, 574
N.E.2d at 237. In Hurwitz, 789 F. Supp. at 138, the court followed the regulations, reasoning
that they were neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with the statutory language.
29. Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 435, 574 N.E.2d at 236; see ERISA § 205(c)(1)(A)(i); 29
U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i).
30. See Hopkins, 214 Ill.
App. 3d at 435, 574 N.E.2d at 236. In Hurwitz, 789 F. Supp. at
137, the court observed that a fiancee cannot effectively waive her rights when signing a
prenuptial agreement because the statutes require the consent of the participant's spouse.
31. Hopkins, 214 Ill.
App. 3d at 435, 574 N.E.2d at 236.
32. 897 F.2d 275 (7th- Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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without following the requirements of ERISA. 3 In Fox Valley, the
court addressed the issue of whether a former spouse, as designated
beneficiary of a lump-sum death benefit, should receive the benefit
despite a provision in a divorce settlement that waived any rights to
the benefit.- The court in Fox Valley remarked that "ERISA allows
beneficiaries to waive their interests." To support this statement,
the Fox Valley court cited to a provision in ERISA that permits a
spouse to waive an interest in joint and survivor benefits "at any
time. '36 In relying on Fox Valley, the Hopkins court appears to have
focused on the words "at any time" and overlooked the word "spouse." 37
ERISA section 1055(c)(1)(A)(i),3 which the Fox Valley court cited, 39
refers to a participant's election to waive the survivor annuity "at any
time during the applicable election period. ' 40 Section 1055(c)(7) defines
the term "applicable election period" as the 90-day period before the
annuity starting date of a joint and survivor retirement annuity. 41 The
election period for a preretirement survivor annuity begins after the
participant attains age thirty-five and ends before the participant's
death. 42 Under section 1055(c) (2), a participant's election to waive the
survivor annuity is ineffective unless (1) the participant's spouse gives
written consent to the election; (2) the election designates a beneficiary
or a form of benefits that cannot be changed without spousal consent
or the spouse relinquishes the right to consent; (3) the spouse acknowl-

33. See Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 434-35, 574 N.E.2d at 235.
34. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 277-78. The Seventh Circuit held that the former spouse was
not entitled to the death benefit because it had been waived in the divorce settlement agreement.
See id. at 280. However, the Sixth Circuit has held that a former spouse was entitled to plan
benefits although the divorce settlement relinquished "any and all" claims, but did not "specifically
refer to the spouse's rights as a beneficiary in an ERISA plan." See McMillan v. Parrott, 913
F.2d 310, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1990).
35. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 279.
36. Id.; ERISA § 205(c)(1)(A)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i).
37. Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 574 N.E.2d at 235. Indeed, the court noted that
spousal status was not relevant to the discussion. Id. at 435, 574 N.E.2d at 236.
38. ERISA § 205(c)(1)(A)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i).
39. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 280.
40. ERISA § 205(c)(1)(A)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i).
41. ERISA § 205(c)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(7) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(6). This period allows
participants and nonparticipant spouses to "judge their respective needs for retirement income
in the light of their other resources." J. LANGBEIN & B. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 435 (1990).
42. ERISA § 205(c)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(7) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(6).
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edges the effect of the participant's election; and (4) a representative
of the plan or a notary public witnesses the spouse's consent.43
The Hopkins court not only relied on ERISA provisions cited in
Fox Valley to deny the nonparticipant benefits, but also noted that
the nonparticipant spouse had prospectively waived benefits under the
plan.M The Hopkins court stated that the nonparticipant spouse
"clearly made an informed choice [to relinquish benefits] in entering
the agreement, and, as such, she should not now be allowed to renege
on that agreement. 4 5 Apparently, the court believed that Congress
intended to permit a nonparticipant spouse to consent to a waiver of
a survivor annuity in an antenuptial agreement because ERISA does
not expressly state that such consent is ineffective. 46 However, the
Hopkins court's interpretation is unwarranted. A canon of statutory
construction provides that an expressed form of conduct infers the
exclusion of another form of conduct. 47 Because ERISA provides only
one method for a nonparticipant spouse to consent to a waiver of a
survivor annuity, a court should not infer that another method is
effective.48 Therefore, the Hopkins court incorrectly inferred that the
nonparticipant spouse could waive benefits by antenuptial agreement.
II.

ASSIGNMENT OR ALIENATION PROHIBITION

Either the estate of a deceased plan participant or the children of
the decedent, as third-party beneficiaries under an antenuptial agreement, may attempt to circumvent ERISA's automatic survivor annuity
by filing a claim with the plan. The claim would be predicated on the
nonparticipant surviving spouse's relinquishment of benefits under an
antenuptial agreement. Nevertheless, such a claim should be denied
because ERISA proscribes assignment or alienation of pension plan
benefits.4 9 Two commentators have referred to ERISA's provision

43. ERISA § 205(c)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(A). For rules
governing waiver and consent under I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(A), see Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-31
(1988).
44. Hopkins, 214 Il. App. 3d at 436, 574 N.E.2d at 236.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. This is sometimes referred to as the maxim of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23-.24
(Sands 4th ed. 1984).
48. Cf. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (noting
that ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute").
49. ERISA § 206(d)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A). Section
1056(d)(1) does not apply to welfare benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). A pension
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proscribing alienation and assignment of pension plan benefits as a
"bedrock principle" underlying ERISA's treatment of third-party
claims.o
ERISA's proscription against assignment or alienation of pension
benefits is subject to two exceptions. Neither applies to relinquishing
survivor benefits under an antenuptial agreement. The first exception
provides for a voluntary and revocable assignment of not more than
ten percent of any benefit payment. 51 The second exception provides
for an assignment through a "qualified domestic relations order" or
QDRO. 52 A QDRO is a state domestic relations judgment, decree, or
order, relating to "child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights."' The QDRO may assign the right to receive benefits
payable under a retirement plan to an alternate payee.' An alternate
payee is "a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a
participant. "s
ERISA was amended by REAct in 1984 to create the exception
for QDROs and thereby clarify the effect of the assignment or alienation proscription on family support obligations.s- Even before REAct,
some courts held that ERISA's proscription did not prevent attachment of plan benefits to meet family support obligations. 57 Congress'
QDRO provision clarified the proscription provision "by creating a
limited exception that permits benefits ...to be divided under certain
circumstances. "8

plan provides retirement income or defers income until retirement. ERISA § 3(2)(A); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2)(A) (1988). A welfare benefit plan provides such benefits as medical and hospital care.
ERISA § 3(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
50. J. LANGBEIN & B. WOLK, supra note 41, at 430.
51. ERISA § 206(d)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A).
52. ERISA § 206(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B).
53. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (1988); I.R.C. § 414(p).
54. ERISA § 206(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 414(p).
55. ERISA § 206(d)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988); I.R.C. § 414(p). A declaratory judgment based on an antenuptial agreement when the spouses have not separated or divorced
should not be regarded as a QDRO. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the prohibition against assignment and alienation "is generally applicable to transfers
involving spouses and necessarily preempts all orders relating to such transfers that do not fall
within the specific and limited QDRO exception"). If a declaratory judgment based on an
antenuptial agreement were under the QDRO exception, the waiver and consent requirements
would be curtailed or circumvented. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20 & 38-43.
56. See J. LANGBEIN & B. WOLK, suprt note 41, at 433.
57. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that pension plan
benefits may be garnished to enforce judgment for alimony and child support payments).
58. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984).
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Congress' intent to create "a limited exception" to the assignment
of benefits suggests that courts should apply ERISA's assignment and
alienation proscriptions strictly 9 Also, Congress indicated in its statement of findings and declaration of policy that it sought to assure

"the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents."' Congress wanted to protect "the interests of participants... and their beneficiaries. ' '1 Thus, Congress clearly designed
the proscription against assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits to preserve the benefits for employees and their spouses.

The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers National Pension Funde supports a strict prohibition
on the ability to assign pension plan benefits. The Guidry Court held

that the prohibition on assignment or alienation of pension benefits
precluded imposing a constructive trust on benefits of an employee
who pleaded guilty to embezzling funds from his employer.6 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, which had

59. Monies received under the Social Security Act are not subject to legal process. Section
407(a) of the Social Security Act states:
The right of any person to any future payment under... [the Social Security
Act] shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under... [the Social Security Act] shall
be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or
to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988).
For opinions rejecting attempts to reach Social Security benefits, see Bennett v. Arkansas,
485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988) ("Section 407(a) unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social
Security benefits."); Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973) (The
provision 'mposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security
benefits.").
In contrast to § 407(a) of the Social Security Act, ERISA § 206(d)(1) states: "Each pension
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."
ERISA § 206(d)(1). Identical language appears in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) and similar language
appears in the first sentence of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988); I.R.C. §
401(a)(13)(A). These provisions that apply to pension plans thus do not prohibit obtaining and
enforcing a judgment against the surviving spouse.
The assignment or alienation proscription for retirement benefits resembles a spendthrift
trust under which a beneficiary cannot voluntarily alienate the interest in the trust and creditors
cannot reach it. See generally Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of Creditors'Rights, 55 IND. L. REV. 247 (1980) (exploring the ramifications of ERISA §
206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), which purport to make every pension trust a spendthrift trust).
60. ERISA § 2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
61. ERISA § 2(c); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
62. 110 S.Ct. 680 (1990); see also Recent Decisions, 29 DUQUESNE L. REv. 139 (1990)
(analyzing Guidry).
63. Guidry, 110 S.Ct. at 635.
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concluded that imposing a constructive trust on pension benefits accorded with principles of trust law and was within a court's discretionary power under ERISA.6 The Supreme Court rejected the view that
courts can make exceptions to ERISA's antialienation provision. The
Court stated that Congress, and not the courts, must undertake the
task of creating exceptions to Congress' policy of safeguarding pension
benefits by prohibiting their alienation.III.

ERISA

PREEMPTION

ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit
plans. 7 However, the scope of ERISA's preemption remains unsettled.6 This unresolved status may foster the notion that ERISA does
not preempt state law governing claims arising out of antenuptial
agreements.6 9 The Supreme Court may have further contributed to
this notion by indicating that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee
benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant
a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." 70 Although the Supreme
Court has decided four cases involving the scope of ERISA's preemption, 71 these cases have not clearly defined the extent to which ERISA
preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans.-

64. Id. at 688.
65. Id. at 684.
66. Id. at 687.
67. ERISA § 514(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). State law includes "decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." ERISA § 514(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1)
(1988). An employee benefit plan includes a pension plan. ERISA § 3(3), (2)(A); 29 U.S.C. §
1002(3), (2)(A) (1988). See generally Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law:
A Study in Effective Federalism,48 U. PiTr. L. REV. 427 (1987) (analyzing ERISA through
concepts of Hamiltonian federalism); Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility
and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109 (1985) (discussing the problems courts face
with the ERISA preemption provision); Conison, supra note 6, at 1083-98 (describing how
ERISA's preemption provision makes applicability of state law problematic).
68. See Gregory, supra note 67, at 435.
69. See Conison, supra note 6, at 1087-88; Irish & Cohen, supra note 67, at 110-12.
70. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
71. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111
S. Ct. 403 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
72. In the context of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2, which mandates that federal law preempts state regulation, the difficulty of defining the
parameters of preemption has been described as follows:
Before a judicial determination occurs . ..the Court must consider the federal
law and its operation compared with the state statute and its operation. Then, the
decision is based upon the specifics of the relationship between the relevant stat-
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73

The Supreme Court has yet to consider ERISA's preemptive effect
on many types of state laws. Lower courts have decided questions of
ERISA preemption by focusing on the particular law involved. For
example, in Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees, the court considered whether ERISA preempts New York common law that prevents
murderers from profiting from their crimes.24 In Mendez-Bellido, the
recipient of survivor benefits under a pension plan was convicted of
murdering her husband, the plan participant. 75 The Mendez-Bellido
court concluded that ERISA did not preempt the common law. 76 Thus,
the common law operated to divest the convicted wife of her rights
to the pension plan benefits.Y
The Mendez-Bellido court observed that "[t]here is no hard and
fast rule for determining whether a state law 'relates to' and is therefore preempted by ERISA, or is 'too remote' and can therefore coexist
with the federal scheme."78 The Mendez-Bellido court relied on the
Second Circuit's Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges opinion. 79 In
Borges, the Second Circuit stated that preempted state laws "are
those that provide an alternative cause of action to employees to collect
benefits protected by ERISA, refer specifically to ERISA plans and
apply solely to them, or interfere with the calculation of benefits owed
to an employee."0 The Borges court held that ERISA did not preempt
Connecticut's escheat law as applied to reserves for uncashed benefit
checks. s, Relying on Borges, the Mendez-Bellido court concluded that
application of the New York common law forbidding murderers from
profiting from their crimes affected neither the determination of an
employee's eligibility for benefits nor the method of calculating the
amount due. 2

utory provisions within the preemption framework. Of necessity the nature of the

problem of discovering congressional intent has resulted in judicial ad hoc balancing.
Therefore, while the significant criteria may be articulated, . . . it is difficult to
apply the rationale underlying a decision in one field to the problem in another
context.
J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supm note 23, § 9.1, at 296.
73. 709 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).

74.
75.

Id. at 331.
Id. at 330.

76. Id. at 331.

77.

See id. at 333.

78.
79.

Id. at 331.
869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 57 (1989).

80. Id. at 146.
81. Id. at 149.
82.

Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 331.
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In deciding that ERISA did not preempt New York's common law
regarding murderers profiting from their crimes, the Mendez-Bellido
court rejected an argument predicated upon the Seventh Circuit's
holding in MacLean v. Ford Motor Co. 3 In MacLean, an executor
contended that pension plan benefits should be distributed under an
employee's will. 4 The MacLean court stated that the plan provided
"a valid method for determining the beneficiary." ' It reasoned that
application of state law governing testamentary transfers would interfere with the plan's administration and would violate the terms of the
plan . 6 The MacLean court added that its "decision that ERISA
preempts state testamentary law furthers the congressional goal of
avoiding 'a patchwork scheme of regulation."'- The Mendez-Bellido
court distinguished MacLean on this point by reasoning that state
laws which prohibit a murderer from profiting from their crimes are
"relatively uniform" in contrast to testamentary laws that vary from
state to state. Thus, state laws regarding murderers do not pose a
"patchwork scheme." 9
Language in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,90 the most recent
Supreme Court opinion concerning preemption, suggests that ERISA
preempts state law governing retirement benefit provisions in an antenuptial agreement. 9' In Ingersoll-Rand, the Court held that ERISA
preempted state common law governing a claim that an employer
unlawfully discharged an employee to prevent the employee from receiving benefits under a pension plan.9 The Court stated that the goal
of ERISA's preemption provision "was to minimize the administrative
and financial burden of [plans and plan sponsors] complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal
Government" that work "to the detriment of plan beneficiaries."- The

83. 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 724.
85. Id. at 728.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 332.
89. Id. But cf. Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill (Thy Spouse): A Recent Exception to the ERISA
PreemptionDoctrine, 29 J. FAM. L. 129, 131 (1990-91) ("The differences among the state slayer
laws will ultimately result in varied treatment of pension plans which is inconsistent with
Congress' goal to provide for their uniform regulation.").
90. 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
91. Id. at 485-86.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 (1990) (citing Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987)); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 & 105
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Court's statement seems to apply to provisions in antenuptial agreements that relinquish plan benefits. Based on the Court's statements,

most lower courts would probably hold that REAct's amendments to
ERISA, which require spousal consent for relinquishment, 9 preclude

a nonparticipant beneficiary from relinquishing benefits before marriage. But some courts may hold, as did the Hopkins court, 95 that the
benefits can be relinquished before marriage in an antenuptial agreement.9
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Commentators have suggested that, to make an antenuptial agree-

ment an effective tool for waiving plan benefits, the agreement should
include the nonparticipant's promise to consent to the participant's

waiver after the parties marry. However, even if a court enforces the
promise, the validity of the consent remains questionable.1 If a pre-

marital promise to consent is ineffective, then consent after marriage,
pursuant to a court order enforcing the premarital promise, should be
ineffective.9 Otherwise, the enforcing court makes the premarital

promise tantamount to postmarital consent. If the nonparticipant
spouse consents to relinquish benefits under court order, the nonparticipant could later attack the order. The nonparticipant could argue
that valid consent requires an informed, voluntary act,9 not one made
under compulsion of a court order. 10°

n.25 (1983) (for cases in which the Court makes statements similar to the language in IngersollRand).
94. ERISA § 205(c)(1)(A)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988); I.R.C. § 417(a)(1)(A)(i).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 21-47.
96. If a plan distributes benefits to the estate or children of the deceased participant after
a court holds that the benefits were relinquished under an antenuptial agreement, the Internal
Revenue Service may disqualify the plan for failing to satisfy the survivor annuity requirements
of I.R.C. § 401(a)(11). Cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-100-35 (Mar. 10, 1989) (finding employer's honoring
of bankruptcy court's order to pay value of participant's benefits will result in disqualification
of plan under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), which proscribes assignment and alienation).
97. See Springs & Bruce, supra note 9, at 7-56; Melbinger & Melbinger, supra note 9, at
26, 30.
98. See Melbinger & Melbinger, supra note 9, at 30, 32.
99. See id. at 26, 30. A representative of the plan or a notary public must witness the
spouse's consent. ERISA §. 205(c)(2)(A)(iii); 29 U.S.C § 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1988); I.R.C. §
417(a)(2)(A)(ii); see supra notes 17 & 43 and accompanying text.
100. See Melbinger & Melbinger, supra note 9, at 30. An action against a nonparticipant
spouse to compel consent to the waiver of the survivor annuity or for damages without a
significant marital rift and divorce looming is unlikely. See id. at 26.
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Commentators have also suggested that a participant can effectively use an antenuptial agreement as a consent to a waiver of benefits
by providing that the surviving spouse's share of other estate property
will be reduced by the amount of expected benefits. 1 1 A court may
find this method of consent ineffective. A court may treat the set-off
or cut-back provision in the antenuptial agreement as an attempt to
circumvent the statutory requirements for spousal consent. A court
may also regard the set-off or cut-back provision as a subterfuge to
10 2
circumvent the spousal protection policy of REAct.
Although a court may disregard a set-off or cut-back provision,
parties to an antenuptial agreement can achieve a similar result that
is more defensible. The antenuptial agreement can provide that if the
nonparticipant spouse survives the participant, the survivor promises
to pay the decedent's children a specified amount. Because a nonparticipant cannot ascertain the amount of survivor benefits, the nonparticipant spouse may, however, refuse to sign an antenuptial agreement
with such a provision. If the surviving spouse dies prematurely, the
amount of the annuity received would be much less than the amount
paid to the deceased participant's children.
Cohabitation is another option for plan participants who are adamant that their children, rather than their surviving spouses, enjoy
their retirement benefits.' 0 3 These individuals may believe that their
spouses will not consent to the waiver of the survivor annuity, or that
a consent would not meet the statutory requirements for waiver. An
attorney can assure a participant-client that if the client does not
marry, there will be no spouse entitled to the survivor annuity. In
states that recognize common law marriages, an attorney should alert
the client-participant that cohabitation, for an extended period of time,
could ripen into marriage. 1-

101. See Springs & Bruce, supra note 9, at 7-56 to -57; Melbinger & Melbinger. supra note
9, at 26, 30.
102. See Springs & Bruce, supra note 9, at 7-56 to -57; Melbinger & Melbinger. supra note
9, at 26, 30.
103. One court has referred to "many middle aged individuals - particularly those with
property or income to protect . . . [who] prefer unmarried cohabitation to formal marriage."
Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1985). Indeed, the court believed that 'there are
now few impediments to establishing joint households without benefit of formal marriage among
people of opposite sex." Id. at 113.
104. If the client decides to cohabit, the attorney should recommend a cohabitation agreement. See, e.g., 3 A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS ch. 95 (1990); AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D §§ 139:161-:188 (rev.
ed. 1985); S. GREEN & J. LONG,MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS § 3.25 (1984).
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737

CONCLUSION

Antenuptial agreements should not attempt to dispose of retirement benefits. ERISA, as amended by REAct, protects nonparticipant
spouses through its survivor benefit provisions and through its proscription of assignment or alienation of benefits. ERISA does not permit
a nonparticipant to relinquish survivor annuities before marriage. If
a participant insists that the antenuptial agreement cover such benefits, the participant's attorney should advise the client, in writing,
that the provision is probably ineffective. The participant's attorney
should also explain that a nonparticipant spouse may be entitled to
survivor benefits under federal law unless the nonparticipant, after
marriage to the participant, has given a timely and well-informed
consent to the designation of a substitute primary beneficiary.
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